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ABSTRACT
to the competition have strong global presence and
resources that far outweigh those of even the largest
U.S. water utilities.

This paper provides an overview of privatization and
competition in the water industry from a public policy
vantage point. In particular, it contrasts the contract
operations model with the private ownership with
regulation model. Advantages and disadvantages of
each model are summarized. The monopolistic nature
of the water industry and the potential need for
structured competition and economic regulation are
discussed.

An intense and meaningful form of competition (a better
term might be “contestability”) is the competition
between public and private ownership. As pressure on
the water industry rises, alternative ownership forms –
both public and private – are explored. In some cases,
the “grass looks greener” on the other side of the fence.
A city that owns its system explores privatization; a city
served by an investor-owned utility considers its rights
of eminent domain. In practice, good and bad
performers can be found on both sides of the
privatization fence. As emphasized by Charles Wolf,
the choice between public and private is a choice
between imperfect alternatives.1

STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION
The U.S. water industry is dominated by public
ownership. Publicly owned systems (municipalities,
counties, districts, and authorities) account for about 43
percent of all community water systems, but about 85
percent of population served, water sales, and revenues
from sales (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
1997). Many of the nation’s numerous small utilities
are privately owned, but several large investor-owned
utilities have a presence in the industry’s composition.
The state public utility commissions regulate only about
20 percent of all community water systems (Beecher,
1995).

Competition and privatization are linked but they are
not identical, despite the frequent commingling of the
concepts. Privatization in itself does not equal or ensure
competition or provide protection against monopoly
abuse.

The water industry has and will continue to display
many characteristics of monopoly. Nonetheless, the
water industry in the 1990s has felt the forces of
competition.
Water utilities are competing with
themselves and with others in a number of venues,
including:
extending service to unserved or
underserved areas; engaging in acquisitions and mergers
(voluntary); bidding for operations contracts; bypassing
the utility (including self-supply); purchasing water on
wholesale markets; trading water rights (alternative
uses); maintaining a service and quality image (bottled
water); promoting public versus private ownership;
contesting markets, ownership, takeovers; and
participating in convergence acquisitions.

PRIVATIZATION RATIONALES
The privatization debate certainly has a basis in
philosophical discourse. E.S. Savas (1987) describes
four sources of support for privatization: ideological,
populist, pragmatic, and commercial. Ideologues want
less government, populists want a better society,
pragmatists want effective solutions, and commercial
interests want more business.
This typology can be used to describe how the U.S.
privatization movement is affecting the water industry.
The populist sentiment seems to play a less important
role than ideology, which also seems to be only
moderately relevant (despite the abundant rhetoric
surrounding privatization). Pragmatism – the need to
solve problems – seems to be a very important factor in
privatization. Even more important is the apparent role
of commercialism. Utilities, contractors, the contract
advisors, think tanks, and members of the trade press

The expanding number of competitors in the water
industry includes investor-owned water utilities,
municipal water utilities, nonutility contract operations
firms, energy holding companies, and foreign
multinational corporations. Some of the newer entrants
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concerns about high water rates and desire to control
rates and rate design, desire for control over local water
resources, interest in achieving tax and financing
advantages, interest in reducing or “keeping” the profit
to spend elsewhere, and – somewhat amazingly – an
interest in shifting from ownership to contract model of
privatization.

have played a very active part in promoting
privatization, often to the exclusion of competing
perspectives. Privatization is considered good for
business (including ancillary businesses), so the
commercial interest in privatization should come as no
surprise.
A central philosophical issue for government
policymakers is whether or not the ownership and/or
operation of water systems are “core” government
functions. Ideas about government’s core functions are
value-based and very personal. Most people agree that
judicial and policing functions are core functions.
Regulation (including the economic, environmental, and
social varieties) also is usually considered core. But
opinions differ about road repairs, refuse collection, and
schools. And of water service – is it “public works” or
a utility business?

While there exist many valid reasons for privatization, it
may be worth calling attention to a few invalid reasons.
These reasons may explain why privatization often is
viewed as a threat. First, privatization should not be
implemented out of fear, intimidation, corruption, or a
false sense of urgency (“now or never”). Second, cities
should avoid cashing in for a one-time monetary
windfall without vision or purpose about the long-term
interest of the community. Finally, privatization should
be viewed as a means to achieving other goals, not as an
end unto itself. In other words, pure rhetoric or
ideology does not seem to provide a solid foundation for
the privatization decision.

Privatization advocates tend to see only a few
governmental functions as core; many of the functions
performed by government are ripe for private
involvement. Skeptics see more functions as core and
worry about the delegation of power and authority and
the potential loss of accountability, as well as the
additional burdens that privatization actually places on
government (Kettl, 1993).

PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE
Several hypotheses favoring privatization have been
advanced in the literature, although they are expressed
more informally than formally. Most can be supported
through anecdotal evidence, but few have been
subjected to rigorous empirical examination.

Several pragmatic reasons for privatization were
identified in a recent study (Beecher, et al., 1995).
Based on thirty nonrandom case studies, the following
arguments were cited: funding needed for capital
improvements
(17
mentions);
environmental
compliance issues (17); source-of-supply or capacity
limitations (11); wanted expert water management (7);
potential to lower construction costs (6); potential to
lower operating costs (5); opportunity costs associated
with municipal funding (5); potential to increase system
efficiency (3); local labor issues or disputes (2); wanted
out of the water/wastewater business (2); and potential
to increase cash flows (2).

The prevailing hypotheses suggest that, compared to
privately managed utilities, publicly managed utilities:
experience more construction-cost overruns; postpone
necessary improvements; overcapitalize (even more
than private utilities); overutilize debt; incur higher
capital and operating costs; are less efficient in
procurement and scheduling; innovate slowly if at all;
provide longer tenure to managers; have greater debt
capacity and access to capital; are more risky and
realize lower returns; subsidize or receive subsidies
from other local government operations; set rates further
from costs (and marginal costs); and favor voters over
nonvoter, businesses over individual consumers, and
organized groups over unorganized groups (Beecher, et
al., 1995).

Other studies have provided insight as to why some
cities have rejected privatization (Johnson and Heilman,
1987). These include economics (high costs and rates,
minimal cost savings, and disagreement over terms);
politics (loss of municipal control over facilities,
employees, and rates); legal issues (unwillingness of the
privatizer to guarantee a proposal due to tax law
uncertainties); and other reasons (including objections
to buy-back provisions, risk of default, and difficulties
with contractors).

While overgeneralization (common to this literature)
should be avoided, the theories behind privatization
actually suggest that ownership may be less important
than competition (or regulation) in achieving
performance gains, and that efficiency practices and
economies of scale are most important (Donahue,
1989). The implication is that many of the apparent
deficits of public ownership can be overcome, at least in
part, through various means.

Although it does not appear to have been studied
systematically, some cities also are choosing
“municipalization.” The key reasons seem to be:
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actively in the implementation process (for example, in
proposal and bid design). They might be considered
“facilitators” by some, “enablers” by others. The
prominent privatization contract advisors include:
Malcolm Pirnie; CH2M Hill; Camp, Dresser, and
McKee; Arthur Andersen; and Raftelis Environmental
Consulting.

Nonetheless, privatization can be advantageous. It
complements the forces of competition and
contestability that have emerged in the industry. It can
bring a much-needed influx of private resources to an
industry facing substantial capital and operating costs.
It can introduce a profit motive to the achievement of
goals (including societal goals).
It can promote
operational efficiency, particularly in the areas of labor,
energy, and treatment chemicals. It can encourage
innovation in management. It can contribute to the
professionalization of the labor force.

By one account, publicly owned systems entered into
186 contracts with a total value of $19.3 billion during
the 1985 to 1998 time period (Public Works Financing,
1998a). Larger contracts in force for various aspects of
water operations and management include Atlanta,
Georgia ($260 mil.); Detroit, Michigan ($260 mil.);
Camden, New Jersey ($200 mil.); Edison, New Jersey
($120 mil.); and Seattle, Washington ($101 mil.).
Larger contracts in force for the wastewater industry
include Cranston, Rhode Island ($400 mil.); Milwaukee,
Wisconsin ($350 mil.); Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
($250 mil.); Indianapolis, Indiana ($225 mil.); and
Camden County, New Jersey ($170 mil.).

TWO MODELS OF PRIVATIZATION
The U.S. privatization experience provides two sharply
contrasting models and yet another form of competition.
The “contracts” model involves public ownership with
“delegated” management, a generally limited use of
private capital for major projects, and intense
competition for contracts. Under the contracts model,
public ownership and the competitive market
“substitute” for economic regulation. In fact, the states
provide little regulatory oversight of contract
agreements.

To be protective of the interests of the principal (the
contracting local government), the contracting process
must include several key elements including but not
limited to: an independent analysis by a qualified
consultant; a carefully designed competitive bidding
process, including prequalification of potential bidders;
a thorough specification of functional roles and
responsibilities; a statement of liability and risk
assumption;
clear,
specific,
and
measurable
performance goals; incentive-based compensation
arrangements based on success in meeting performance
goals; a plan for public information and involvement; a
procedure for securing regulatory approvals; a
performance
review
and
evaluation
process;
mechanisms for major and minor conflict resolution;
and provisions for termination and transition upon
completion of the term (Beecher, et al., 1995).

The “ownership” model consists of investor ownership,
use of private capital for major projects, and limited
(and highly structured) competition. Investor-owned
water utilities are subject to the jurisdiction of the state
public utility commissions, which approve territories
and terms of service, investments, expenditures, prices,
and rates of return (profits).

Contracts
The contracts model is receiving considerable attention,
even though some contracting activity has always
occurred. The model has many variations, with various
types and degrees of private-sector involvement.2
Contracting has gained considerable ground in the
wastewater sector but is gaining interest in the water
sector as well. Recent tax policy changes have
stimulated contract activity but many institutional and
political barriers remain.

The need for “best practices” in the design and
implementation of privatization arrangements is great.
In September 1998, a coalition of privatization interests
provided a proposed checklist to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, which has asserted
review authority for long-term concession agreements
(Public Works Financing, 1998b).

The leading contract firms in the United States include:
United Water Services (Lyonnaise des Eaux), American
Commonwealth,
Environmental
Management,
Professional Services Group, U.S. Filter, U.S. Water
LLC, Earth Tech, OMI/CH2M Hill, Severn Trent
Environmental, and Vivendi (Compagnie Générale des
Eaux). The recent merger trend continues to narrow the
list and further concentrate market power. Participating
actively in the contract process is a select group of firms
that advise cities about how to privatize and participate

A well designed and carefully implemented contractual
arrangement can offer several potential advantages over
the status quo: efficiency and innovation (demonstrable
savings) for cities that will not otherwise implement
these measures or sell their systems; bidding process
drives down costs; maintains low-cost (subsidized)
financing options; maintains tax advantages for the
system; allows a wide range of costing and ratemaking
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market. Second, they challenge the capacity of local
governments to design and oversee contracts to protect
their interests over the long haul.
Experienced
contractors generally have the advantage in the
contracting process. Third, and perhaps most important,
they suggest the possibility of monopoly power and
potential for abuse over time.

alternatives; creates a mobile professional work force;
retains local control for development and ratemaking
purposes (also a disadvantage); fewer barriers to entry
than private ownership; and may facilitate transition to
other options (including private ownership).
These advantages are not insignificant. Indeed, some
water and wastewater systems have experienced
demonstrable savings and achievements since initiating
contract arrangements.
However, the potential
disadvantages of the contracts model appear to be quite
numerous: more emphasis on bidding process than
long-term accountability; competition is intermittent at
best; “quiet” (no bid) renewals and sweetheart deals;
special technical processes may “lock in” a contractor
with expertise; contracting is oligopolistic at the bidding
stage because few firms qualify; contracting is
monopolistic once the contract is awarded, with
relatively weak competitive pressure over time;
principal-agent issues, namely whose interests are
served when responsibilities are “delegated”;3 potential
for ruinous competition (underbidding); contracting
obscures responsibility for investment decisions; can
increase or shift risks to cities; may cause under
investment in infrastructure; contracting limits infusion
of private capital; capacity of local government and the
need to be a “smart buyer”;4 potential need for micromanagement or “micro-oversight” to ensure that
performance goals are met; politicization of
decisionmaking (including ratemaking practices);
downsides of franchise arrangements (cable television,
for instance); barriers to termination and market exit;5
bidding presumes maintenance of current prices;
decoupled costs and prices provides no assurance that
savings or “profits” will flow to system improvements
or to ratepayers (often not);6 require “foolproof”
contracts and crystal-clear performance incentives, and
meaningful enforcement mechanisms; contracting can
invite favoritism, waste, fraud, and corruption involving
public and private partners;7 “best practices” are not
well established; and spatial and temporal boundaries of
cities thwart optimal long-term solutions, namely
regionalization. A patchwork of private contracts, in
other words, will not help the water industry achieve
much needed scale economies through the formation of
publicly or privately owned regional systems.

The issue of persistent monopoly power is perhaps the
most important consideration for policymakers. Fine
lines and distinctions are drawn between contracts,
concessions, and franchises. But in reality, each has
elements of monopoly power. A twenty-five year cycle
of bidding – however intense the bidding – hardly
constitutes robust competition.8 The competition is
intermittent at best. Moreover, the contracts model is
designed rather transparently to circumvent the
authority of the state to regulate monopolies and their
profits. According to one of the leading contract
advisors, “A very restrictive feature in many states is the
inability to remove the privatization transaction from
the control of the public service commission of that
state. As a result, rates of return are strictly monitored.”
(Raftelis, 1993, p. 115)

Private Ownership
Private ownership is sometimes considered the “pure”
form of privatization. Like the contracts model, the
ownership model has both advantages and
disadvantages. Some of the advantages of private
ownership are based not in private ownership alone but
in private ownership coupled with regulation of the
monopoly. These advantages include: establishes water
service as a business, more like other major utilities;
encourages private investment; more efficient
procurement practices; allows unbounded regional and
multisystem solutions (for both water and wastewater
services); maintains ongoing competitive pressure for
efficiency via contestability (because of the eminent
domain powers of cities); pride of ownership (especially
when
employee-owned);
establishes
long-term
accountability; less vulnerable to trends and changes in
local politics; reduces potential for fraud and corruption;
and regulation can control monopoly abuse, protect
ratepayers, and provide powerful ongoing performance
incentives (rate of return).

The longer the contract, the greater is the opportunity
for the contractor to produce promised results and avoid
significant adversities, such as drastic labor cuts.
Contracts are growing longer in length and more
lucrative financially, to the obvious benefit of the
contracting community. Larger and longer contracts
reduce risks and enhance profitability, but they have
other implications as well. First, they narrow the field
of viable competitors, resulting in an oligopolistic

Private ownership of water systems also demonstrates
some potentially relevant disadvantages: for cities,
asset sales provide a one-time windfall; loss of the
financing and tax advantages of public and nonprofit
ownership; prices often increase to cover true costs; can
shift costs without reducing costs; difficulty in valuation
of utility property; perceived loss of local control;
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not alter the basic public monopoly. Often, local
control over rates is offered as a justification for local
independence from regulation. However, the continued
decoupling of costs and rates can lead to inefficiency
and inequity for ratepayers. Cities may view the water
system as a potential source of subsidies for other
programs once savings are achieved.
Significant
private involvement in a public monopoly raises core
accountability issues.
Regulation of the ultimate
monopoly – the city – may be justified by publicinterest considerations.

reliance on regulatory oversight; risk of over investment
(building the rate base); limits to the traditional
regulatory model, particularly with regard to certain
performance incentives; concern about regulatory
environment; the inability for investor-owned utilities to
compete because of the lack of a level playing field
(financing, tax, and other considerations); and the limits
of contestability to encourage discipline.
In sum, the key advantages of the contract model are
gains in efficiency and professional expertise, a lower
cost of capital, and the preservation of local control.
Key ownership advantages are private investment and
longevity, opportunities for regionalization, and
accountability via independent oversight (economic
regulation).

Another major consideration is the uneven playing field
for competition, which presents one of the most
formidable barriers to the efficient restructuring of the
water industry. Various public policies contribute to
this unevenness.
Each of the major players in the water industry
competition has distinct advantages. The advantages of
publicly owned systems are tax exemption, financing,
subsidies, flexibility in designing rates and charges,
eminent domain power, and unrestrained marketing
ability. Nonprofit systems have tax and financing
advantages, as well as a possible advantage in terms of
the ability to promote regionalization. Given the current
policy regime, nonprofit systems may be especially
advantageous. The chief advantage of contractors is the
absence of state oversight and profit regulation, and the
ability to secure long and lucrative agreements. Energy
companies and foreign investors have the distinct
advantage of deep pockets for acquisitions and
expansion. Somewhat ironically, investor-owned water
utilities are the least advantaged in this equation but
they can boast brand name recognition and longevity in
the water business.

MONOPOLY AND RUINOUS COMPETITION
Privatization raises several key considerations. One,
mentioned already, is the monopolistic character of
water service. Privatization that creates or maintains
unrestrained monopoly power is the worst possible
choice. As noted by Donahue (1989, p. 78), “Half a
market system – profit drive without meaningful
specifications or competitive discipline – can be worse
than none.”
The term “monopoly” has evolved to have a pejorative
meaning.
A more neutral understanding is that
monopoly is simply an efficient means of organizing
certain economic activities based on the dominant
characteristic of those activities.9 Water service is
highly monopolistic and demonstrates many of the
classic economic features of monopoly: barriers to
entry (economic and legal), capital intensity, high fixed
costs, economies of scale (declining unit costs),
inefficiency in redundancy (more than one pipe), the
obligation to provide service on demand, and limited
opportunities for substitution or choices.10

A related consideration is the potential for “ruinous”
competition – an old-fashioned but potentially useful
term in the context of an uneven playing field for
competition.
Ruinous competition does what it
suggests: ruin the prospects of an otherwise viable
participant in the market place. Potentially ruinous
competition in the water industry today includes:
underbidding for contracts (loss leaders), excessive
bidding and concession fees that distort markets,11
overpaying for acquisitions, cream skimming of and
bypass by large-volume customers, underpricing by
unregulated firms in markets with regulated firms, and
(perhaps the most serious) persuading cities to condemn
private utilities and turn the system over to private
contractors.

Some noneconomic rationales for monopoly
organization of water service also can be provided.
First, water service is “vested with a public interest”
because of water’s central role in maintaining life.
Second, a related point is that water service is essential
for providing related services that also are essential –
fire protection and sanitation. Third, water is an
environmental resource that is finite and available at
nature’s convenience.
The persistent power of public monopolies is a concern
at least as important as the economic power of
contractors. In fact, the relationship can be mutually
exploitive. Competitive bids and private contracts do

The concept of ruinous competition was used to
rationalize the formulation of economic regulation in
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regulation can provide: a check of monopoly power and
allowance of reasonable profits (regardless of
ownership); an independent review of the prudence of
investments and expenditures and the justness and
reasonableness of rates; uniformity and openness in
record keeping and cost accounting; performance
incentives (cost recovery and rates of return); assurance
that benefits flow to systems and ratepayers; more
efficient (that is, cost-based) water prices; an
expeditious forum for hearing disputes and resolving
complaints
among
utilities,
contractors,
and
customers;13 a level playing field for structured
competition; the legitimacy and authority of the state
and additional safeguards to cities; more regulatory
capacity than local governments and economies of
regulation (which frees local resources for other
pursuits); less need to micromanage utility
decisionmaking; fewer opportunities for coercion,
corruption, or politicization; and attention to long-term
social, environmental issues.

the first place and it might be used to rationalize the
extension of regulatory oversight today:
The emergence of unregulated competition for
firms that are subject to price regulation can, in
some circumstances, form the basis for the
extension of regulation to the new unregulated
competition in order to permit the original
regulatory scheme to serve some of its purposes
effectively. This extension of regulation to
protect existing regulation typically occurs in
one of two situations—when unregulated
competition threatens to undermine minimum
price regulation, and when unregulated
competition threatens to interfere with the
pursuit of social policies through rate design…
[U]nregulated competition in the market served
by the regulated firms constitutes a direct threat
to the ability of minimum rate regulation to
protect the revenues and financial condition of
the regulated firms. (Pierce and Gellhorn, 1994,
p. 62)

Traditional rate-of-return regulation, despite its
limitations, provides a powerful system of incentives.
Regulators provide utilities with an authorized but not a
guaranteed rate of return.
Under pressure from
stockholders, utilities must work to achieve their
authorized return between rate cases. In fact, most
regulated systems find it difficult to achieve their
authorized return, particularly in recent years. Rate-ofreturn incentives can be used to reward systems that
meet performance goals, including efficiency as well as
social and environmental goals. Also, modifications
and regulatory alternatives (price caps) are emerging to
address the shortcomings of the traditional regulatory
model, fine-tune incentives, and provide greater
flexibility.

THE ROLE OF REGULATION
Privatization of a monopolistic industry beckons for the
consideration of economic regulation.
Economic
regulation recognizes the monopolistic nature of the
industry and seeks to balance the interests of producers
and consumers. Regulation can address financial
stability and operational reliability concerns.
Regulation may be particularly necessary when costs
are rising and demand is flat, as is the case for the water
sector.12 Regulation can encourage the application of
least-cost solutions, including regionalization to achieve
economies of scale. The role of regulation and the
capacity of governing institutions to regulate are paid
more attention in the context of privatizing global stateowned enterprises.

The state regulatory “climate” in which investor-owned
utilities operate plays a salient but little analyzed role in
the choice between ownership and competition
(Beecher, et al., 1995). A level playing field for
competition would stimulate more ownership.
Regulation can and should be adapted to meet the
changing conditions and needs of the private
participants in the water industry.

The long life of water utility assets and concerns about
intergenerational equity also may justify regulation.
Regulation also can address other equity issues that
arise inevitably in the provision of an essential service,
including the ability of subpopulations to pay for
service. Regulation also can be adapted to different
types of water and wastewater systems and various
forms of ownership. Regulation can be applied to the
public, nonprofit, and private sectors alike. Exemptions
from regulation can be provided under some
circumstances, while broader regulatory authority is
maintained.

STRUCTURED COMPETITION
Structured competition might be used to combine
certain elements of competition with the protective
features of regulation.
Structured competition
recognizes both the monopolistic character of the water
industry and the rationale for regulation stemming from
economic and noneconomic considerations.

Economic regulation substitutes for public ownership on
the one hand and competitive markets on the other.
When thoughtfully designed and implemented,
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policies toward the participants in the competition, a
very different water industry might emerge.

Although the model must be more fully developed and
articulated, elements of structured competition might
include: uniform record keeping and cost accounting;
comparability in ratemaking practices, including all
tariffs and charges; modified or flexible regulation to
achieve policy goals, including positive performance
incentives; promotion of wholesale water markets to
help achieve regionalization; approval of flexible,
negotiated, or market-based rates, especially under
competitive circumstances; consistent policy on
franchises and the exclusivity of service areas;
allowance of entry into new service markets through
regulated or unregulated affiliates based on risk
assessment; profit-sharing for ancillary services
provided by regulated utilities; [pre]certification of
privatizers, regulatory review of operations contracts,
and regulatory dispute resolution between cities and
contractors; and uniform regulatory jurisdiction for
publicly and privately owned utilities and rules to help
level the playing field for competition.

CONCLUSION
The private sector can, will, and should play a role in
the water industry. However, privatization alone does
not ensure a competitive market or the discipline that
competition brings. Occasional competition does not
resolve the fundamental issues of monopoly that arise in
the provision of water services. However tempting,
accountability should not be sacrificed at the altar of
efficiency. Government should harness the resources
and innovations of the private sector while recognizing
the need to oversee a very monopolistic industry that
also is vested with a public interest.
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Designing and implementing a structured competition
model for the water industry would be a daunting task,
but the alternative is to continue on the path of
fragmented policy, distorted competition, and potential
monopoly abuse.
PRIVATIZATION POLICY
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ENDNOTES:
1

Wolf (1991) stresses the importance of understanding
of both market and nonmarket (government) failure. See
also Vickers and Yarrow (1991).
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